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The political economy of regulation: does it
have any lessons for accounting research?
Michael Moran*
Abstract— The paper argues that regulation is at the heart of markets, and that regulation is itself an inherently political
process. It explores how this insight works out by examining a range of real existing national regulatory systems – notably the
US, the UK and the European Union. It argues that political jurisdiction matters, because of the influence of institutional
structure, political culture and historical trajectory. It suggests that these insights need to be central to accounting research,
because at the heart of accounting research lie processes which are critical to the regulation of economic life.
Keywords: regulation; politics; accounting; law; government
1. Politics, economics and regulation
The regulation of economic life is where politics
and economics meet; in that simple sense every-
thing to do with regulation concerns political
economy. Of course in the academic languages of
both political economy and of regulation many
meanings and theories jostle for primacy. Indeed, in
academic worlds increasingly plagued by over-
specialisation both ‘political economy’ and ‘regu-
lation’ have emerged as unifying notions:
intellectual locations where scholars and practition-
ers can emerge from different disciplinary silos to
talk to each other (Moran, 2002).
A necessarily brief paper is not the place to scan
the world of theory in political economy or of
regulation (for such a scan see, for example, Eisner
et al. 2006). But regulation is at the heart of any
relationship between business and the modern state
in one obvious sense: in modern capitalist systems
the way business engages with markets is condi-
tioned by a state-backed regulatory framework.
The most obvious form this takes is a set of rules
governing market exchanges – the kind provided
by, for instance, the system of commercial law. In
this sense regulation of business life is ubiquitous
in the modern market economy. And the theory
and practice of accounting must lie at the heart of
this, for accounting provides the critical social
technologies which enable regulation in this broad
sense to be conducted in a market economy.
‘Regulation’ suggests the existence of a distinctive
model of business–government relations: distinct-
ive, for instance, from one where the state expects
to replace the market economy with some more
directive instruments, like public ownership. But it
is here that the uncertainties begin. To put it a bit
simply: there are two very different sources of our
image of regulation, and what it implies for the
role of the state in economic life. One is derived
from a particular national experience; the other
from the perceived experience of the wider
economy of advanced capitalism in the last
generation.
The single most important national system of
capitalist democracy exists in the US. American
capitalist democracy has been distinctive not only in
its scale and global influence. It has also pioneered a
special kind of state–business relationship. That has
created an American ‘regulatory state’ – the most
important formation on earth to deserve that title. As
we shall see, this American regulatory state has a
number of distinctive features: attitude to enterprise
ownership; institutional forms; and historical tra-
jectory.
We shall also see that the relationships developed
between the regulatory state and business in the US
have often been very different from those suggested
by the second source of the phrase: those that derive
from attempts to summarise what has happened to
the relationship between the state and business
community in the wider world of advanced capit-
alism, especially in Europe, over recent decades.
This latter image of the regulatory state contrasts it
with more interventionist models of economic
management – and therefore with more interven-
tionist models of the relationship between the state
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and the business enterprise, and by extension
between the state, accountancy and the business
enterprise.
One of the quickest ways of appreciating what
this latter image is trying to tell us is to reflect for a
moment on what lies behind the picture of a
‘regulator.’ It is a metaphor, and one borrowed from
regulation in physical systems. In a physical system
– like a steam engine or centrally regulated
domestic heating – the regulator is a balancer
keeping the system in some pre-determined equi-
librium. Applied to economic regulation this sug-
gests that the state is a manager of the market
system, but a manager that intervenes only to return
it to some point of equilibrium. One of the most
graphic images conveying this is provided by the
highly influential work of Osborne and Gaebler
(1992). They interpret long-term changes in the
character of the modern state as involving a shift
from ‘rowing’ to ‘steering’. In the former, the state
either commanded large scale resources, such as
publicly owned industries, and used them to
determine social and economic outcomes; or in
the American instance which so concerned
Osborne and Gaebler, it substituted direct owner-
ship with regulation of a ‘command and control’
variety, issuing specific regulatory commands
backed by the force of law. By contrast, when it
chooses to ‘steer’ rather than ‘row’ the state is
transformed into a kind of social ‘pilot’, guiding the
systems of economy and society. This latter picture
assigns the state a relatively subordinate role in its
dealings with markets, for it is responding to
signals, in the manner of a pilot, from its environ-
ment – and in democratic capitalism a dominant
part of that environment is made up of the market
system.
But here the ambiguities and uncertainties
multiply. The image of a ‘steering’ state is not
new, and some versions convey a very different
meaning – indeed a sinister, anti-democratic mean-
ing – from that involved in touching the tiller. The
first great work of political theory, Plato’s Republic
(circa 400BC) offers an image of authoritarian
political leadership in which an elite is pictured
precisely in the language of the ‘pilot’ of society. At
the other end of the time span, one of the most
brutally authoritarian governing systems of the 20th
century, that of Communist China, celebrated the
leadership of the ‘Great Helmsman’, Mao Zedong –
one of the most savage tyrants in a century of
savage tyrants. Totalitarian steering of the kind
practised by the Great Helmsman committed some
of the greatest crimes recorded in human history
(see Scott, 1998).
The very different meanings conveyed by the
phrase ‘regulator’ suggest that if we want to get an
accurate image of what it means in reality, and in
particular what it means for the market system, we
should not start with theoretical accounts based on
images of regulation; we should instead look at
some real live states. That is the approach I take
here. The most important example of a practising
regulatory state, as we have noted, is the US. The
very idea of modern market regulation is an
American invention; and most of the important
institutional innovations, and problems, in business
regulation, are American in origin. We shall see that
the history of the regulatory state took a fresh turn in
Western Europe from the 1980s onwards, both at
the level of the European Union (EU) and at the
level of some individual member states. That fresh
turn is indeed commonly pictured in the language of
regulation as pilotage; examining this account is the
purpose of the section that follows my account of
the US.
2. The American regulatory state:
adversarialism, cooperation and capture
The relationship between the American regulatory
state and the business enterprise is strikingly
distinctive, viewed comparatively.
The simplest, but perhaps the most important,
indicator of distinction, is that this is a relationship
with deep historical roots. The pre-industrial
American economy was one where the state was
closely involved directly in the conduct of eco-
nomic life, for instance in the chartering of corpor-
ations. But the relationship with business took a
special turn in the closing decades of the 19th
century. That special turn was a reaction to a great
economic revolution which spanned the generation
following the end of the Civil War. This era saw the
development for the first time of a significant
plutocratic class, immortalised in the idea of the
‘robber barons’ who emerged in the second half of
the 19th century to dominate parts of the newly
developing economy: for instance Carnegie in steel,
Rockefeller in oil, Vanderbilt in rail (Josephson,
1962). The wealth of this class was fabulous by
American historical standards, and the economic
and political power that it was able to exercise was
correspondingly great: ‘During the 1840s there
were not twenty millionaires in the entire country;
by 1910 there were probably more than twenty
millionaires in the United States Senate.’
(Hofstadter, 1955–1972: 136).
The change was succeeded, in the last quarter of
the 19th century, by an even more profound
institutional development: the appearance of a
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new form of economic organisation – new to
American society, but also to the rest of the
capitalist world. It consisted of giant corporations
which captured markets in whole sectors, and which
increasingly developed their own distinctive forms
of internal organisation (Lamoreaux, 1985). They
were a world away from that of the small farmer or
storeowner who was the mythical centre of the
traditional American economy. These corporations
were soon to pioneer new forms of internal
divisional organisation, which gave professional
managers, rather than entrepreneurs, a central role
(Chandler 1977: 6–12). They were, in Chandler’s
arresting phrase, a ‘visible hand’, which displaced
much of the ‘invisible’ hand of the market. The rise
of these new giants was also associated with the
emergence of new centres of financial power,
publicly often demonised as the ‘Money Trust’
allegedly organised on Wall Street (Carosso, 1973).
These great changes had political origins, and
they had political consequences. The rise of the new
giant corporations was not the result of some
process of natural economic evolution; it reflected
the exploitation of the political environment by
creative entrepreneurs (Roy, 1997: 10–-20). They
turned the American state in a distinctive direction
and may be said to have been the unintended
progenitors of the American regulatory state –
unintended because it was in response to the rise of
the great new centres of business power that the
clamour for regulation originated. The period was
one of extraordinary social and economic change –
and of corresponding stress, notably for the ‘old’
economy and society of rural America, as it felt the
impact of the new economic power and the new
economic challenges. The most important political
manifestation of this was Populism, a great move-
ment of agrarian radicalism that reached its height in
the 1890s. It arose out of the stresses and problems
imposed on small business rural America by the
momentous changes of the second half of the
century, and was a reaction against the figures and
institutions that seemed to be behind, and to benefit
from, those changes: the new plutocracy repre-
sented in the public mind by the ‘Robber Barons’;
the giant corporations that seemed to be able to
control, rather than be controlled by, markets; the
new centres of finance, and their perceived ability to
control the terms on which small entrepreneurs
could get credit. The ensuing crisis of legitimacy for
big business was expressed in the view that, in place
of small enterprises with a human face and spirit,
there had been created corporations without a ‘soul’
(Marchand, 1998).
The single most important result of this hostility
was the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890. This
law was prompted by the furious debates over the
alleged power of the trusts. It is agreed by scholars
that the Act was aimed at the capacity of the new
corporations to manipulate market competition, but
critical interpretations have subsequently stressed
the limited impact of the Act and its symbolic rather
than substantive role. Critics of its effectiveness
point to the extent to which the original proposals
were shorn of sanctions during passage through
Congress, and the extent to which later court
interpretations created a jurisprudence which min-
imised the impact of the law on corporate combin-
ations (Bowman, 1996: 63–69). The Act
nevertheless has claims to be the founding measure
for a federal regulatory state aimed at controlling
corporate power. But it did not develop in isolation.
It is a touchstone because it accompanied other
events in the birth of the American regulatory state.
To this period, thus, also belongs the creation of the
Interstate Commerce Commission (1887–1995)
from which we can date one of the characteristic
forms of business regulation for the next century –
rate and service regulation, which extended over
time into industries created by new technologies,
like airlines and telephones (Stone, 1991).
Likewise, the passage of the Food and Drugs Act
1906 inaugurated a key, and enduring, history of
federal regulation of both the food and pharma-
ceutical industries, leading to the establishment of a
major regulatory agency, the Food and Drug
Administration (Hilts, 2003).
These are important episodes because they
resonate through the political history of the regu-
lation of business in America. Movements critical
of the exercise of American business power have
deep historical roots. There exists a strong and long
established tradition of highly adversarial criticism
of business institutions. This tradition exists in spite
of, or perhaps even because of, the absence of the
kind of root and branch opposition to capitalism
represented by socialist movements in Europe, and
in spite of the weakness of any American tradition
of direct ownership of productive resources by the
state.
The Great Crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great
Depression reignited this tradition of suspicion of
big business, and especially of big business iden-
tified with the ‘money trusts’ of Wall Street. This
was an era of financial catastrophe, revelations of
fraud, the collapse of production, and mass
unemployment. Out of this came the ‘New Deal’,
shorthand for a series of social and economic
reforms introduced under the Presidency of
Roosevelt. The ‘New Deal’ is a powerful symbol
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for a new relationship between government, busi-
ness and society, and a key development in the
American regulatory state – but the meaning of that
symbol, we shall see, continues to be contested.
The New Deal built on the foundations of
populism to create some of the key institutions of
a regulatory state, and thus of a distinctively
American way of ordering the relations between
government and business. The heart of this new
regulatory state was a series of Federal regulatory
agencies. The most important of these were con-
centrated on financial markets and institutions: for
instance, the Securities and Exchange Commission
regulated stock markets; the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation safeguarded small deposits
in banks and, as a corollary, regulated the prudential
conduct of those banks (Moran 1984, 1991).
The New Deal also established a highly distinct-
ive mode of regulation that has ever since deeply
shaped the relations between business, the state and
the wider political system. The most important
feature of this mode is the dominance of the law and
of legal argument. Formed by statute, in a culture
where law was already central to the regulation of
social relationships, the regulatory process soon
became heavily shaped by the courts and by legal
argument. Lawyers emerged as the key figures in
negotiating the relationship between the new regu-
latory state and American business, both in the
regulated enterprises and in the regulatory institu-
tions. The law schools of the universities became
important providers of skilled professionals for this
new regulatory state (McCraw, 1984: 243–244).We
will later see one key consequence: the importation
into the regulation of business of a distinctive
feature of American legal culture – its reliance on
adversarial argument between opposing parties as a
means of determining outcomes.
The creation of new regulatory bodies and new,
legally informed ways of thinking about business
policy can be thought of as involving the imposition
of constraints on business institutions – a common
perception among critics of the New Deal in the
business community. But this was not the whole
story. Another feature of the regulatory state that the
New Deal created reminds us that business institu-
tions in the US, whatever popular hostility they
aroused, still entered the New Deal with formidable
power resources. The most important resource was
ideological: attachment to the market order still
dominated the minds of most Americans
(Galambos, 1975). The aim of the New Deal was
to stabilise, not replace, the business order (Foley,
2007: 279). The institutional structure, and the
actual practices of the new regulatory bodies,
ensured that there was a great deal of cooperative
regulation with business, market actors being
encouraged to take responsibility for running their
own regulatory affairs. A good example of the style
of the new regulatory state is provided by the single
most important agency established by the New
Deal, the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The Commission was designed to regulate the
institution – stock exchanges – that had been at the
heart of the scandalous collapses in 1929. But from
the start the leadership of the Commission was
drawn from the very markets where scandal had
originated: its first chairman, Joseph Kennedy,
founded the fortune of the Kennedy political
dynasty by financial speculation in the 1920s.
More important still, the Commission worked
through a kind of ‘franchising’ system: it delegated
responsibility for regulation to the stock exchanges
themselves, mostly restricting itself to authorising
and supervising these self-regulatory bodies
(Seligman, 1982: 103–123).
In short, there is a contradictory history to the
American regulatory state: a contradiction between
a cooperative regulatory mode and a culture of
adversarial suspicion. We can see the two at work in
the great turn taken by regulation from the 1960s.
This was the era when the interest of the regulatory
state expanded to what is generally called the new
‘social’ regulation: control of the environmental
consequences of firm activity; control of health and
safety in the workplace; control over (discrimin-
atory) hiring and employment practices.
The new age of social regulation prompted an
intensification of a key trait in the American system
of business regulation: a further marked turn to the
law, and indeed to a particularly adversarial form of
law (Stewart, 1988). Analysts like Vogel have
established that, viewed comparatively, American
regulation has long been more legalistic and
punitive than regulation in most other large capit-
alist economies (Vogel, 1978, 1986, 1989, 1996).
But the advent of the new social regulation
heightened these features. It strengthened a culture
of what Kagan (2001 and 2007) calls ‘adversarial
legalism’, the key features of which were a
willingness to impose (often draconian) penalties
on enterprises for breaches of regulations, and a
readiness both on the part of the regulated and the
regulators to resort to adversarial confrontation in
courts to settle disputes. This readiness in turn
reflects a wider culture of litigation, and the fact
that, increasingly, institutions and groups not
directly party to the regulatory process have
shown a readiness to try to intervene by invoking
law.
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The contradictory inheritance continues to shape
the politics of the relationship between business and
the American regulatory state. The corporation is
confronted by a two-headed beast: one with a
smiling face, the other snarling at business. In recent
decades – since the Reagan revolution of the 1980s
– these contradictory aspects of the state have
struggled for supremacy.
Business influence over regulation has been
strengthened by a number of developments, notably
by a paradigm shift within the intellectual world of
the regulators themselves, and by a shift in the
priorities of politicians. There has occurred a
change in the balance of analytical skills repre-
sented in the agencies, and a change in perceptions
of the character of the regulatory task. As we saw
earlier, the great age of the institutionalisation of the
regulatory state was also the age of legal dominance
over the regulatory process. But since the 1980s
lawyers have been joined, and to some degree
supplanted, by economists, and this has coincided
with a shift in the way regulatory intervention is
defended: justification is increasingly done in the
language of micro-economic impact analysis
(Eisner et al., 2006: 59–60). A pioneer in this
change was the great economist (and deregulator of
airlines) Alfred Kahn, who liked to quip that for him
aeroplanes were just ‘marginal costs with wings’
(McCraw, 1984: 224).
This intellectual change has accompanied a
growing lack of confidence in ‘command and
control regulation’: that system which relies on
the enforcement of regulation by issuing commands
down a legally backed hierarchy. The rise of
economists and economics helped legitimise the
deregulation movement, which produced liberalis-
ing reforms in industries, like telecommunications,
airlines and financial services. It also encouraged
experiments with ‘soft’ regulation: these include the
attempt to use market style mechanisms (such as
licensing systems allowing the purchase of ‘pollu-
tion permits’ in environmental regulation). There
developed a conviction that some areas of regula-
tion were so technically complex that ‘command
and control’ was too blunt an instrument, thus
prompting experiments in the delegation of regu-
latory authority to affected industries and enter-
prises, subject only to the achievement of broadly
prescribed standards (Eisner et al., 2006; Eisner,
2007).
These paradigm shifts can call on that tradition in
the American regulatory state which approved of
close business involvement in self-policing. But
they were reinforced by the wider ideological shifts
of recent decades. Although these date mostly from
the ‘Reagan revolution’, some of their origins lie in
the 1970s: the landmark deregulation of airlines,
and of financial services, for instance, was well
under way by the time that decade ended. But the
Reagan Presidency nevertheless marked a distinct
change in the climate created by partisan politicians
(Eisner et al., 2006). Every President since Reagan
has, at some period of office, announced a tempor-
ary standstill on the making of regulations, usually
expressed in the language of relieving the ‘burden’
of regulation on business. And even the one
President who publicly presented himself partly as
an opponent of the Reaganite tradition – Clinton –
also publicly endorsed Osborne and Gaebler’s
theory of a shift towards a ‘steering’ government;
indeed it is the appropriation of Osborne and
Gaebler’s language of ‘reinventing government’ by
the Clinton Administration which made their work
so well known and so influential. Every President
since the start of the 1980s has talked the language
of the ‘burden’ of regulation on business, of
deregulation, and of ‘soft’ regulatory initiatives.
This is the aspect of the American regulatory
state which has looked with a benign gaze on
business in recent decades. But the other, snarling,
face has also been in evidence. There is still life in
the adversarial tradition, a tradition that is in part the
product of the old populist suspicion of big
business, and in part the product of the adversarial
legal culture. Studies of American public opinion
show a deep-rooted suspicion of big business,
alongside an equally deep-rooted tendency to
mythologise the virtues of small business (Vogel,
1996; Dennis, 2004). And for all the experiments
with ‘soft’ law, the revolution in regulation signalled
by the advent of the new social regulation in the
1960s produced an irreversible juridification of the
regulatory process, which has permanently exposed
business to adversarial, punitive enforcement.
Kagan and Axelrad’s comparative study of regula-
tory enforcement paints a consistent picture of
American distinctiveness: of a greater willingness
to confront and to punish the corporation in the US
by comparison with experience in other leading
capitalist democracies (Kagan and Axelrad, 2000).
This exposure to the peculiarities of American
legalism has taken a form which has been hugely
damaging to the business enterprise. American
liability law is distinctive in its expansive interpret-
ation of liability for damages, and the result has
been to expose enterprises to highly expensive
lawsuits: the targets have been as diverse as
asbestos and tobacco (Sicilia, 2004). In a legal
culture, which is not only adversarial but also
fiercely competitive, the potential rewards of suc-
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cessful cases have also stimulated the development
of a highly aggressive branch of the legal services
industry. Lawyers have invested some of their gains
in one area (for instance asbestos) to fund cases in
others (for instance tobacco). They have also used
their wealth to fund, and try to influence, the
competitive electoral system in order to defend the
jurisprudential assumptions which support this
thriving industry (Derthick, 2005).
The continuing reality of adversarial implemen-
tation, combined with a vigorous, threatening
industry staffed by liability lawyers shows that,
whatever the rhetoric of democratic politicians or
academic theorists, the practical implementation of
regulation is often anything but business friendly
in the American regulatory state. One important
reason the actual record of successive Presidents
does not match their deregulatory rhetoric is that
there are powerful wider social forces driving
continual regulatory intervention in the affairs of
the enterprise. The most immediate manifestation
is the way scandal functions as a driver of
regulatory change. One of the most striking
examples will be very familiar to accounting
researchers and practitioners: the experience of
financial regulation, notably of accounting and
audit, in recent years. In the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 Congress transformed what had been a
settled domain of self-regulation dominated by the
industry into virtually a paradigm of traditional,
adversarial command and control regulation. The
moving force behind this was a series of financial
scandals and collapses, of which the best known
was the Enron Corporation. But ‘best known’ is
the appropriate phrase here. Business operates
under the scrutiny of a highly competitive (and
therefore aggressive) media system, which is
constantly searching for scandals to discover and
expose (Berry, 1999: 120–130); and under a
highly competitive political system in which
legislators are constantly searching for scandalous
regulatory failures to remedy. In other words, there
are important features inscribed in the very
character of the American regulatory state which
are pushing it in the direction of deeper and wider
controls over business, even as politicians and
regulators talk the language of deregulation and
light touch control.
The briefest characterisation that we can offer of
the American regulatory state is also the most
obvious. It is American: that is, it can only be
understood as a manifestation of very special
American historical development, institutional
innovation and cultural patterning. Is the same
true of our second great example?
3. The European regulatory state: coping
with economic crisis and democratic politics
I have given time and space to the US in part
because the experience of business with the
American regulatory state provides a kind of
informal ‘benchmark’ against which we can try to
understand the European regulatory state – a
formation that has its origins in the political
economy of the 1970s. By that time, as we have
seen, the American regulatory state had a number of
well-established features. It had developed out of a
long series of crises dating back over a century. It
was marked by the linked traits inscribed in
American political culture and American legal
culture: that is, it was enmeshed in the institutions
of democratic politics and it was commonly char-
acterised in its enforcement practices by adversarial
legalism. It thus presented two faces to business: a
benign face which represented deregulation, liber-
alisation, an emphasis on consultation with busi-
ness, and light touch implementation; and a hostile
face which represented the long history of suspicion
of big business and a determination to settle
economic disputes by adversarial challenge in the
courts.
The most influential account of the rise of the
regulatory state in Europe, that offered by Majone
(1991, 1996 and 1999), begins by invoking some of
these American parallels, but we can see immedi-
ately that the American example is ambiguous: it
leaves unsettled the question of whether a regula-
tory state is business friendly or business hostile.
The most obvious sense in whichMajone’s model is
American is that it is consciously Madisonian. That
is, it draws on the tradition of constitutional
argument in the US which derives from the
contribution of James Madison, one of the key
figures in the debates that surrounded institution
building in the early American Republic – and who
argued for institutional designs that would insulate
government from popular pressures. It suggests that
the regulatory state is a necessary response to the
complexities of economic government in capitalist
democracy, and thus a necessary alternative to
majoritarian models of democratic decision-mak-
ing. As an alternative it offers insulation from
majoritarian democracy – hence the Madisonian
inspiration. Since the regulatory state is pictured as
a functional response to high complexity in eco-
nomic government, an obvious question is: why did
it only develop in Europe after the 1970s?
Complexity of this kind under capitalist democracy
is, after all, hardly something new. Two novel
conditions in the 1970s help explain the change.
Both created a problem in relations between the EU
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and the business system. The first sprang from the
limits to state building in the new system of
economic government being constructed in the
European Economic Community (now the EU). On
Majone’s account the central governing institutions
of this new system of economic government –
notably its key executive agency, the European
Commission – have been forced to depart from the
command modes of control so common in the
member states because of the character of the new
‘state’: in particular, it lacks the fiscal resources and
– partly as a result – the resources in skilled
personnel directly to exercise control. It has thus
been forced to appropriate the doctrine of sub-
sidiarity, under which responsibility is delegated to
lower levels and, in part as a result, the policies
which are be implemented have to be worked out in
consultation with the affected parties. As far as
business is concerned, this means that it can expect
to be closely involved in policy formulation, and to
have a big say over policy implementation. The
future in such a state seems to lie with business self-
regulation. This expectation is reinforced by the
second condition identified by Majone as a
prompter of the rise of the regulatory state: the
problems of the Keynesian economic order follow-
ing the end of the ‘long boom’ in the advanced
capitalist nations in the early 1970s. The exhaustion
of Keynesianism also signalled the exhaustion of an
age of direct, large-scale state intervention in
economic life, and a turn to regulation in the
‘steering’ sense identified at the beginning of this
paper.
These twin conditions – the turn to indirect
modes of government via the doctrine of subsidiar-
ity and the turn away fromKeynesianism – combine
to produce an (embryonic) European regulatory
state: a mode of economic government which is
‘regulatory’ in the twin sense that it relies on the
promulgation of rules which are implemented
elsewhere, and in the sense that it conceives the
tasks of economic government as balancing and
steering rather than direct control. Out of these twin
forces come a European regulatory state that
practises economic government by establishing
broad rules (like Directives) in consultation with
affected interests; these interests are then heavily
involved in shaping the transposition of those rules
into practical measures within individual national
economies, individual sectors and even individual
enterprises.
It will be clear that this is a ‘business friendly’
system of economic government, at least in intent.
And it has another intended feature, which is
designed to make it more business friendly still. We
recall that the institutions and arenas of regulation in
the US were heavily ‘politicised’: that is, infused
with the influences of democratic accountability
and partisan political argument. Because they are
faced with a powerful Congress intent on oversight,
agencies are constantly exposed to the influences of
majoritarian democracy. The regulatory state move-
ment in Europe, both at the level of the EU and, as
we shall see, at the level of important member
states, has been driven by a very different force: the
desire to ‘depoliticise’ – which is to say, to take out
of the partisan democratic arena issues formerly
subject to democratic argument and to replace them
with agencies that are insulated from the pressures
of majoritarian democracy. The most important sign
of this is the development documented by Coen and
by Thatcher: the spread of ‘non-majoritarian’ regu-
latory agencies across the EU, both in its most
important member states and at the level of the EU
itself (Coen and Thatcher, 2008; Thatcher 2002a,
2002b, 2005, 2007). As far as the EU is concerned,
the most important creation is the European Central
Bank (ECB), an agency with an increasingly
elaborate and wide mandate which controls a
decision – determination of short-term interest
rates – formerly widely dispersed, and commonly
controlled by democratically elected politicians.
What is more, it is an agency whose mandate has
been shaped by pro-business ideologies, notably the
object of controlling inflation and advancing ‘sound
money’ doctrines. This development exactly fits the
pattern of what Majone calls Madisonian democ-
racy – an emphasis on the technocratic settlement of
policy problems through a process of adjustment
between the affected interests.
Viewed in these terms, the European regulatory
state looks a much more unambiguously business
friendly political formation than does its American
counterpart. What is more a number of contingent
features support this picture. In its search for
partners in regulation the Commission has a well-
documented history of seeking to involve business
interests, notably the largest enterprises (Coen,
1998 and 2007). In addition, the lobbying worlds
which surround the making of regulatory policy at
EU level are populated by a well-organised industry
where some of the best-resourced actors are busi-
ness institutions. Moreover, when we look at the
European regulatory state in American terms one
key feature is missing: with the exception of the
ECB, it is hard to identify European regulatory
agencies with anything like the clout, resources or
status that characterise the institutional giants of
American federal regulation. The complex systems
of ‘double delegation’ (Coen and Thatcher, 2008)
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practised in the EU mean that even when agencies
are created they are typically mired in complexities
of multi-level governance. An instance is provided
by the example of the European Chemicals Agency,
created in 2007 to register and evaluate chemicals
across the EU – a vital matter (European Chemicals
Agency, 2008). Most of the detailed work of the
Agency is actually delegated to individual member
states, while key parts of the industry – such as the
production of pesticides – are regulated under an
entirely different regime. In short, the institution
which has given the American regulatory state ‘bite’
in its dealing with business, the public regulatory
agency, is a much more enfeebled animal in the
European case. Moreover, Coen and Thatcher’s
study (2008) of the creation of EU-wide networks of
regulators – a second best solution to the problem of
developing some EU-wide regulatory capacity -
suggests that these networks are of very limited use;
they are certainly no substitute for the institutional
giants of American regulation.
But this summary judgment that the European
regulatory state is business friendly is complicated
by two developments, one at the level of the EU
itself, and one in an important member state.
As far as the EU is concerned, whatever the
rhetoric, it is not plain that the practice of EU shaped
regulation is indeed light touch. Much depends on
the perspective of the affected interest. The diversity
and complexity of business interests across the EU –
divided by sector, by size and by national regulatory
traditions – means that the impact of regulatory
intervention will be felt very differently by different
groups. From the point of view of business
regulatory systems that were historically weighted
towards voluntary self-regulation, such as those of
the UK or Ireland, many regulatory interventions –
in areas as disparate as the regulation of product
packaging and labelling, and the regulation of
workplace safety – have been experienced as the
creation of quite prescriptive systems of rules. More
important still, the impact of the single most
important regulatory agency created by the EU,
the ECB, has had complex and highly varying
effects on business interests in different sectors.
This is hardly a surprise because the Bank is trying
to operate a single interest rate rule across a hugely
diverse set of capitalist economies: consider the
impact of a single interest rate regime on business
communities as diverse in their market position,
form of organisation and cultural understandings as
those of Germany, Spain and the Republic of
Ireland. Only by construing business ‘interests’ at
an almost metaphysical level of abstraction could
the operations of the EU’s interest rate regime be
identified as unambiguously ‘business friendly’.
The developing institutional capacity and ambitions
of the ECB are also changing its relations with
business interests. The Bank has rapidly developed
as an institution with its own highly distinctive
organisational culture: it is a major promoter and
shaper of banking systems, notably in the new
accession states of the EU, and is also a rapidly
developing centre of expertise about both monetary
policy and banking supervision and regulation
(Moran and Macartney, 2009). In short, it is in
many instances superordinate, rather than subor-
dinate, in its dealings with key banking interests;
indeed, in respect of the rebuilt private enterprise
banking systems of the former Communist autoc-
racies it has been critical in the very construction of
business interests (Johnson, 2006).
This tendency for regulatory agencies to develop
distinctive institutional cultures and powerful
resources of expertise and information, independent
of regulated interests, and often capable of imposing
their will on those interests, is a well documented
feature of the American regulatory state. It is
connected to another feature also well documented
in regulatory systems: the importance of struggles
for ‘turf’ and influence in the systems of bureau-
cratic politics that are the natural by-product of the
regulatory state. The process is well illustrated by
the case of competition regulation in the EU, a
critical part of the EU’s area of competency in
economic government. Wilks has called DG IV (the
name of the competent DG at the time) the most
powerful agency for the regulation of competition
on earth (Wilks, 1999; and see also Wilks 2005;
Wilks andMcGowan 1996;Wilks and Bartle 2002).
Under a succession of Commissioners it has also
turned into one of the most abrasive, quite matching
American regulators in its enforcement style. It has
been involved in a series of high profile confron-
tations with large firms, both European and
American; it has, American fashion, used its powers
to raid the offices of firms (in the search for evidence
of collusion); and it has used its power to impose
huge fines on large American and European multi-
nationals, perhaps the most notable example being
provided by its protracted battle with Microsoft.
The second major complication produced by the
‘business friendly’ image of the European regula-
tory state is provided by the case of one member
state, the UK. The UK is critical to understanding
the European regulatory state in part because
Britain is a major national economy, and the most
important financial centre in the EU. But it also has
a more analytical importance, because in the UKwe
have seen, in recent decades, the most ambitious
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 11/6/2010 06 ABR Moran.3d Page 222 of 226
222 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:34
 03
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
attempt by any leading capitalist democracy to
construct a new regulatory order. The relationship
of business to this new regulatory order is puzzling
and ambiguous. The puzzle may be stated as
follows. On the one hand, the British regulatory
state exactly follows the kind of path we might have
expected had we followed Majone’s reasoning.
After the end of the long boom in the 1970s the
British economy, and the British system of eco-
nomic government, entered a protracted crisis – in
many ways the most serious crisis of any advanced
capitalist economy. That was succeeded in the
1980s, under the premiership of Margaret Thatcher,
by the implementation of some of the most radical
reforms in the advanced capitalist world. The state
attempted to withdraw from the direct control of
large areas of economic life. The big symbols of that
were the partial disavowal of Keynesian theories of
active management of the macro economy, and the
programme of privatisation of publicly owned
enterprises – the most ambitious programme of
privatisation in any large capitalist economy. The
state also attempted to remove many restrictive
practices in the economy. The most important
examples were in labour markets and in financial
markets – the latter symbolised by the ‘Big Bang’ on
the London Stock Exchange, which dismantled
barriers to market entry and to price competition.
The state also moved in the direction of relying
heavily on reformed, or newly created, regulatory
agencies to manage economic life. These agencies
were constructed so as to ensure that areas of
economic life that had hitherto been heavily politi-
cised (that is, under the influence of democratic,
partisan politics) were now to be run in a
‘depoliticised’ fashion. The two most striking
examples of this were: the gradual depoliticisation
of monetary policy, culminating in 1997 in the
transfer of responsibility for setting short-term
interest rates to an independent Monetary Policy
Committee of the Bank of England; and the creation
of a network of regulatory agencies to manage the
newly privatised industries. This latter innovation –
the creation of free-standing regulatory agencies –
was soon extended to other parts of business
regulation, either by the reform and integration of
existing bodies (the experience of environmental
policy) or by the creation of new free-standing
institutions (the experience in broadcasting).
But if business believed that in the process it was
getting a more compliant state, the experience of the
two decades or so of the British regulatory state will
have disabused it of that illusion. The turn to
regulation in practice created new and formidable
instruments of state control. There are four main
reasons for this unpleasant outcome – unpleasant at
least as far as business is concerned.
The first is that in key areas of economic life, of
which the financial markets are the most important,
the new agencies of regulation replaced systems of
self-regulation that had been under the control of the
actors in the marketplace. What is more, by
replacing an informal, and often secretive, system
by openly organised and explicitly empowered
public bodies, the reforms forced into the public
domain issues that could once be settled tacitly. The
shift to statutory-based regulation also made the
system look much more ‘American’ in one other
key respect: it made the courts and the law
important in the implementation of regulation.
Second, whatever the ambitions of the creators, it
has proved impossible to ‘depoliticise’ the new
systems of regulation. The history of the regulation
of privatised industries is a particularly instructive
example. The original theorists of regulation
thought of it as a transitional arrangement, which
would be succeeded by a ‘withering away of
regulation’ as market forces asserted themselves.
In truth, regulation of privatisation has become
more complex, more detailed and more entrenched.
What is more, a whole set of public policy issues –
to do with the appropriate levels of enterprise profit,
and executive reward – have proved impossible to
keep from the democratic public arena (for details,
Moran, 2007: 95–123). The great crisis of 2007–
2008 only intensified this process of politicisation.
Third, this process of politicising regulation has
proved impossible to contain; it has spilled over into
hitherto ‘depoliticised’ domains in an often uncon-
trollable fashion. In whole areas of company law
and company regulation recent decades have been
an age of turmoil, of constant changes of rules and
of the intervention of democratic politicians into
arenas like corporate governance. Of course, busi-
ness has fought back, and often fought back
successfully; the fabulous enrichment of the cor-
porate elite in recent decades shows that the most
powerful have often been able to resist the
complaints of democratic politics. But they have
had to do precisely that: argue and resist, in fields
that were once the domain of uncontested, silent
acquiescence.
Fourth, and finally, the relationship between
many of the new agencies and business has proved
anything but easy, for at least some of the agencies
have been far from business compliant. This is most
evident in the field of the regulation of competition,
maybe the single most important domain of regu-
lation, especially for the large enterprise, The
history of the regulation of competition for about
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50 years after the SecondWorldWar was dominated
by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission,
which, as Wilks’ (1999) history shows, was essen-
tially a business-friendly institution that expected to
regulate in a cooperative fashion, especially in
cooperation with the biggest firms. The successor
institutions operate under very different mandates
and with very different institutional cultures. They
have been involved in a number of high profile
clashes with individual enterprises, often working
in concert with Brussels regulators; these clashes
show that the largest enterprises now have to
operate in a very different way from the cooperative
world of the old Monopolies and Mergers
Commission.
The regulatory state in Europe does not quite
match the extremes of smiling and snarling that we
saw in the case of its American relative; neverthe-
less, as far as business is concerned it is a complex
and moody animal to deal with.
4. Regulation, accounting and national
regulatory cultures
My argument in this paper is simplicity itself:
regulation of any domain of economic life is a
political affair. And since it is a political affair at its
heart lies a set of relationships between business
interests and the state. Disentangling those rela-
tionships – making sense of that grand phrase ‘the
political economy of regulation’ – involves close
attention to territorial patterns of regulation, since
states inhabit a world of territory. Making sense of
the political economy of regulation involves mak-
ing sense of national patterns of regulation. And it is
here that the implications for practice and research
in accounting begin to become clear. The formal
language of accounting in principle offers a polit-
ically neutral set of social technologies for the
practice of regulation in key areas of business life in
the market economy. But what I have sought to
show here is that the application of these social
technologies is inevitably a political matter, and is
therefore shaped by the political setting – institu-
tional and cultural – in which it operates.
Accounting practice is a critical arena where politics
and economics meet – and is therefore critical to the
political economy of the market system.
References
Berry, J. (1999). The New Liberalism: the rising power of
citizen groups. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press.
Bowman, S. (1996). The Modern Corporation and
American Political Thought: law, power and ideology.
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press.
Carosso, V. (1973). ‘TheWall Street Money Trust from Pujo
through Medina’. Business History Review,XLVII: 4, 421–
437.
Chandler, A. (1977). The Visible Hand: the managerial
revolution in American business. Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press.
Coen, D. (1998). ‘The European business interest and the
nation state: large firm lobbying in the European Union and
member states’. Journal of Public Policy 18(1): 75–100.
Coen, D. (2007). ‘Empirical and theoretical studies in EU
lobbying’. Journal of European Public Policy, 14(3): 333–
345.
Coen, D. and Thatcher, M. (2008). ‘Network governance
and multilevel delegation: European networks of regula-
tory agencies’. Journal of Public Policy, 28(1): 49–71.
Dennis, W. (2004). The Public Reviews Small Business.
Washington, DC: National Federation of Independent
Businesses Research Foundation.
Derthick, M. (2005). Up in Smoke: from legislation to
litigation in tobacco politics. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Eisner, M. (2007). Governing the Environment: the trans-
formation of environmental regulation. Boulder, NV:
Lynne Rienner.
Eisner, M., Worsham, J. and Ringquist, E. (2006).
Contemporary Regulatory Policy, 2nd edn. Boulder, NV:
Lynne Riener.
European Chemicals Agency (2008) ‘About ECHA’ http://
echa.europa.eu/home – accessed 25 May 2008.
Foley, M. (2007). American Credo: the place of ideas in US
politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Galambos, L. (1975). The Public Image of Big Business in
America. Baltimore, MD: the Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Hilts, P. (2003). Protecting America’s Health: The FDA,
Business, and One Hundred Years of Regulation. New
York, NY: Alfred E. Knopf.
Hofstadter, R. (1955/1972). The Age of Reform: from Bryan
to FDR. New York, NY: Knopf.
Johnson, J. (2006). ‘Two-track diffusion and Central Bank
embeddedness: the politics of Euro adoption in Hungary
and the Czech Republic’. Review of International Political
Economy, 13(3): 361–386.
Josephson, M. (1962). The Robber Barons: the great
American capitalists 1861–-1901. London: Eyre and
Spottiswoode.
Kagan, R. (2001). Adversarial Legalism: the American Way
of Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kagan, R. (2007). ‘Globalization and legal change: the
‘‘Americanization’’ of European law?’. Regulation and
Governance, 1(2): 99–120.
Kagan, R. and Axelrad, L. (2000). (eds.) Regulatory
Encounters; multinational corporations and American
adversarial legalism. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press.
Lamoreaux, N. (1985). The Great Merger Movement in
American Business, 1885–1904. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
McCraw, T. (1984). Prophets of Regulation. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Majone, G. (1991). ‘Cross-national sources of regulatory
policymaking in Europe and the United States’. Journal of
Public Policy, 11(1): 79–109.
Majone, G. (1996). Regulating Europe. London: Routledge.
Majone, G. (1999). ‘The regulatory state and its legitimacy
problems’. West European Politics, 22(1): 1–24.
Marchand, R. (1998). Creating the Corporate Soul: the rise
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 11/6/2010 06 ABR Moran.3d Page 224 of 226
224 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:34
 03
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
of public relations and corporate imagery in American big
business. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Moran, M. (1984). ‘Politics, banks and markets: an Anglo-
American comparison’. Political Studies, 32(1): 173—189.
Moran, M. (1991). The Politics of the Financial Services
Revolution: the USA, UK and Japan. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Moran, M. (2002). ‘Understanding the regulatory state’.
British Journal of Political Science, 32: 391–413.
Moran, M. (2007). The British Regulatory State: high
modernism and hyper-innovation, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Moran, M. and Macartney, H. (2009), ‘Central banking and
financial supervision: internationalisation, Europeanization
and power’. In K. Dyson (ed.), Central Banks in the Age of
the Euro: Europeanization, Convergence and Power,
Oxford: Oxford University Press: 337–354.
Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992). Reinventing
Government: how the entreprenurial spirit is transforming
the public sector. Reading, MA.: Addison Wesley.
Roy, W. (1997). Socializing Capital: the rise of the large
industrial corporation in America. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Scott, J. (1998). Seeing Like a State: how certain schemes to
improve the human condition have failed. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Seligman, J. (1982). The Transformation of Wall Street: a
history of the Securities and Exchange Commission and
modern corporate finance.Boston,MA: HoughtonMifflin.
Sicilia, D. (2004). ‘The corporation under siege: social
movements, regulation, public relations and tort law since
the SecondWorldWar’. In K. Lipartito and D. Sicilia (eds.),
Constructing Corporate America: history, politics, culture.
Oxford: Oxford University Press: 188–220.
Stewart, R. (1988). ‘Regulation and the crisis of legitimisa-
tion in the United States’. In T. Daintith (ed.), Law as an
Instrument of Economic Policy. Berlin: de Gruyter: 97–
133.
Stone, R. (1991). The Interstate Commerce Commission and
the railroad industry: a history of regulatory policy. New
York, NY: Praeger.
Thatcher, M. (2002a) ‘Analysing regulatory reform in
Europe’. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(5): 859–
872.
Thatcher, M. (2002b) ‘Delegation to Independent
Regulatory Agencies’. West European Politics, 25(1):
125–145.
Thatcher, M. (2005) ‘The Third Force? Independent regu-
latory agencies and elected politicians in Europe’.
Governance, 18(3): 347–374.
Thatcher, M. (2007) Internationalization and Economic
Institutions. Comparing European Experiences. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Vogel, D. (1978). Lobbying the Corporation: citizen chal-
lenges to business authority. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Vogel, D. (1986). National Styles of Regulation: environ-
mental policy in Great Britain and the United States.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Vogel, D. (1989). Fluctuating Fortunes: the political power
of business in America. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Vogel, D. (1996). Kindred Strangers. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Wilks, S. (1999). In the public interest: competition policy
and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Wilks, S. (2005). ‘Agency escape: decentralization or
dominance of the European Commission in the moderniza-
tion of competition policy’. Governance 18(3): 431–452.
Wilks, S. and Bartle, I. (2002). ‘The unanticipated conse-
quences of creating independent competitive agencies’.
West European Politics, 25(2): 148–172.
Wilks, S., and McGowan, L. (1996). ‘Competition policy in
the European Union: creating a federal agency’. In G.
Doern and S. Wilks (eds.), Comparative Competition
Policy. Oxford: Clarendon: 225–267.
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 11/6/2010 06 ABR Moran.3d Page 225 of 226
Vol. 40, No. 3. 2010 International Accounting Policy Forum 225
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:34
 03
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
